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9 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO for Warning

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Will Soviet Bloc Reaction to INF Deployment Include New Moves Against West Berlin?

1. You will note that my draft cover memo for the April NIO Monthly Report raises the possibility of some kind of restrictions on or harassment of Western access to West and East Berlin. The notion that Soviet and/or East German moves that would precipitate something resembling a new "Berlin crisis" would be difficult for Community analysts to deal with because it challenges conventional wisdom that both the Soviets and the East Germans have strong incentives to maintain the status quo established by the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. I would endorse this view of Soviet and East German interests and intentions as a general rule, but it will be important as the deployment date approaches to keep this assumption under close (and skeptical) review.

2. As the draft memo also notes, "Andropov has deepened the Soviet commitment to respond firmly to INF deployment next winter." The Community's treatment of possible Soviet reactions so far has focused on military countermeasures. For example, what do the Soviets mean when they say they will place the U.S. in "an analogous position?" JPRMs in Nicaragua, Suriname, Grenada? Additional deployment of cruise-missile submarines off U.S. coasts? JPRMs in Siberia opposite Alaska? Military countermeasures obviously have high priority in the Community's projections. But when Andropov warns that a "chain reaction is inevitable" and that the USSR, East Germany (named specifically), and other Warsaw Pact states "will be compelled to adopt response measures," it would be prudent to canvas a range of non-military "countermeasures" as well.

3. There can be no doubt that, from Moscow's standpoint, West Germany will play the crucial role in deciding the fate of INF deployment and that Bonn, therefore, will be the principal target of Soviet threats and inducements as the deployment date approaches, and of Soviet reactions if deployment proceeds on schedule. It would be remarkable indeed if the Soviet leaders were to ignore the exposed pressure point that Berlin represents in their plans for defeating INF or, failing this, for responding to the consequent change in the European nuclear balance--a change which Moscow itself has chosen to exaggerate and to over-inflate the stakes in the INF issue.

4. For these reasons, it seems to me that analysts responsible for warning with respect to Soviet intentions and moves should pay close attention to the possible signals contained in Honecker's cancellation of his visit to West Germany next fall--at a time when anti-INF demonstrations will be in full voice--and to East Germany's threat in late April to curtail West German access to West Berlin. Moscow radio on 4 May broadcast a Berlin TASS dispatch on a Neues Deutschland article on East-West German relations which drew a direct connection between INF deployment and the state of German relations and the security of West Berlin: "The deployment of the new US nuclear systems...would in no way facilitate the

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establishment of normal, not to mention good-neighborly relations. Nobody should forget that the GDR cannot be blackmailed, that any such attempt would be damaging not only to the GDR but also to the FRG and also West Berlin, which as is known, does not belong to the FRG and cannot be administered by it." The TASS dispatch concluded by affirming that, "On the basis of concluded treaties we (the GDR) want to act and will act in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence in the interests of ensuring peace in Europe and developing good relations between the two German states." Neues Deutschland and TASS discreetly refrained from saying how the situation might be changed if West Germany disregards "concluded treaties" and ignores the requirements of peaceful coexistence in West Berlin.

5. It is predictable that this not-so-subtle hint will be followed by a stream of more ominous and specific warnings about the possible implications for West Berlin and East-West German relations if Bonn proceeds with INF deployment. You may recall that in my warning projection for 1983 (dated 8 February), I suggested that "if initial INF deployments proceed despite Soviet blackmail," the Soviets, *inter alia*, might "reopen unfinished business in Berlin by reviving their demands in 1976 and 1977 for termination of Allied military patrols in East Berlin and perhaps of Allied Military Liaison Mission tours in East Germany." I would add to this a unilateral move to alter, if not abrogate, the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, perhaps by removing Soviet military personnel and substituting East German soldiers at the checkpoints on road and rail access points between East and West Germany and around West Berlin.

6. Finally, I would suggest that we not under-estimate Moscow's determination first to block INF deployment or, if blackmail and inducements prove unsuccessful, to impose significant costs on West Germany and its allies through both political and military retaliatory measures. The Soviets are already irreversibly committed to adopt stern countermeasures, and their incentives to act forcefully have been reinforced by an assessment that NATO has maneuvered itself into a highly vulnerable posture on the whole INF issue. Events next winter may prove that the Soviets have been deluding themselves about the extent of this vulnerability and, in particular, about political trends in West Germany which have made the Kohl government a ripe target for coercive diplomacy. Perhaps. But my basic point is that Soviet perceptions will be decisive, not the US intelligence community's estimate that Bonn and the other NATO basing countries will go ahead with deployment regardless of Soviet threats and countermeasures.

7. I would contend that Andropov and company are as deeply committed to act in response to INF deployment as Khrushchev was in 1958-1962 to force the West to accept his terms for a West Berlin settlement and a German peace treaty. The West's stubborn resistance to Khrushchev's bold thrusts, of course, ultimately drove him to install missiles in Cuba in a desperate bid to break the Western position. Historical analogies are always hazardous, but it seems to me that the record obliges "warners" to be particularly alert and sensitive when they see a proud and determined Soviet leadership digging itself into a potentially dangerous commitment. Andropov and Neues Deutschland have sounded a loud and clear early warning: any attempt to "blackmail" East Germany will "damage" both West Germany and West Berlin.

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